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A main contribution of linked longitudinal employer-employee data is
to provide a decomposition of wage rates into components due to individ-
ual heterogeneity and to ﬁrm heterogeneity. In France, Abowd, Creecy,
and Kramarz (2002) show that the person eﬀect and ﬁrm eﬀect account,
respectively, for 70 percent and 20 percent of the variation of wages. The
person-eﬀect component is bigger in France than in the United States
where it represents half of the wage variation.
This indicates that the devices used by ﬁrms to attract or select workers
with speciﬁc characteristics play a central role in determining the ﬁrm’s wage
structure. However, these devices have not been investigated thoroughly by
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comments.interview, a human resource management (HRM) practice that could con-
tribute to the two goals of selecting workers and stimulating their eﬀort. In
France, 52 percent of employees with more than one year of seniority in
manufacturing had been evaluated at least once in 1997. At that time, evalu-
ation interviews were not regulated at the national or at the industry level.
As an HRM practice, the function of evaluation interviews is not clear-
cut. Sometimes viewed as formal performance appraisal systems, evalua-
tion interviews often use complex evaluation grids referring to loosely de-
ﬁned behavioral characteristics as well as to precisely deﬁned goals and
measured criteria.
To assess evaluation interviews, it is useful to analyze them theoretically
and to investigate empirically how they are implemented within ﬁrms. The
theoretical framework we are going to use in this paper is the one (hereafter
the DGU model) proposed by Diaye, Greenan, and Urdanivia (2007).
Intuitively, individual evaluation interviews are used to assess perfor-
mance once the employee has undertaken her or his task. We will use here
the term of ex post evaluation interviews. But, if we refer to a classic wage-
setting mechanism, there is no need for evaluation. The incentive wages
drives the employee toward the level of eﬀort that is optimal for the em-
ployer. In the DGU model, ex post evaluation interviews insure risk ad-
verse agent against technological or market uncertainty.
In the French context, Crifo, Diaye, and Greenan (2004) observe that
evaluation interviews are signiﬁcantly more frequent when the employee is
involved in collective work. The model of ex post evaluation interviews is
limited to give account of the function of evaluation interviews when em-
ployees work in teams because individual performance appraisal become
diﬃcult when the output cannot be separated between the members of a
team (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Diaye, Greenan, and Urdanivia (2007)
propose a model of ex ante individual evaluation interviews speciﬁc to the
teamwork context, where evaluation comes ﬁrst, before the constitution of
teams and aims at fostering a team spirit. They conclude their theoretical
approach by establishing some predictions about drivers and outcomes of
individual evaluation interviews.
In this paper, we want to assess empirically part of these predictions. Our
empirical investigation rests on a matched employer-employee survey (sec-
tion 3.2) on organizational change and information and communication
technology (ICT) use (computerization and organizational change [COI]).
In the labor force section of the survey, employees are asked whether they
have been interviewed individually at least once in 1997. They also give in-
formation on work organization, on personal characteristics, and on out-
comes. The business section of the survey gives a detailed set of ﬁrm-level
characteristics reﬂecting technological and organizational choices imple-
mented in French manufacturing at the end of the 1990s. We use a propen-
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eﬀect of individual evaluation interviews on eﬀort, work overload, and
wage setting. In section 3.5, we conclude.
3.2 The Data
We are going to use a matched employer-employee survey, the survey on
computerization and organizational change (COI), to assess the DGU
model of evaluation interviews. The information we have in the survey will
not allow us to test all the predictions from their model. However, from the
employee section of the survey, we have some information on the charac-
teristics of work (whether individual or collective), on evaluation inter-
views, on eﬀort, and on wages. This will allow us to cover the main features
underlined by the DGU model. More precisely, we will be able to test
whether evaluation interviews lead to higher levels of eﬀort than classical
incentive schemes (prediction 1). Our estimation strategy will also allow us
to assess the existence of a selection eﬀect associated with the implementa-
tion of evaluation interviews in individual and collective work organiza-
tions (prediction 2). Furthermore, using measures of work overload, we
will check whether evaluation interviews drive workers toward an excessive
work intensity leading to ineﬃciencies (prediction 3). Indeed, according to
the DGU model, evaluation interviews in a context of supermodular tech-
nology (i.e., the conditional probability of success of the task is a strictly
increasing convex function of the employees’ level of eﬀort) lead to an
overintensiﬁcation of work in the sense that the employees’ level of eﬀort
will be higher than the one “required” by the ﬁrm. The reason is the selec-
tion eﬀect regarding disutility of eﬀort. Prediction 3 is a possible conse-
quence of this result on overintensiﬁcation. It is important to test this 
implication because work overload is a major factor of stress and has long-
term implications on the health of the workforce, especially in a context of
aging. Finally, we will be able to test our predictions on wage diﬀerentials
and on the employees’ knowledge of the rules driving wage setting between
the scheme with evaluation interviews and the classical incentive scheme
(prediction 4).
The COI survey was conducted at the end of 1997 by the French public
statistical system.1 We are going to work on a representative sample of
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1. The conception and coordination of the COI survey has been directed by the Center for
Labor Studies. The survey has been carried out in a consortium involving the Ministry of
Labor (DARES), the Ministry of Industry (SESSI), the Ministry of Agriculture (SCEES),
and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). It beneﬁted from 
very high response rates: 82 percent for employers and 75 percent for the employees. For a 
detailed description of the survey, see Greenan and Hamon-Cholet (2001) or http://www
.enquetecoi.net.manufacturing ﬁrms with more than ﬁfty employees and on a sample of
randomly selected employees within these ﬁrms. In matched employer-
employee surveys, the budget constraint implies a trade-oﬀ between trying
to capture the diversity of ﬁrms and trying to capture the diversity of the
workforce within ﬁrms. By choosing to interview small sample of employ-
ees (one, two, or three) within each ﬁrm, COI chooses to favor the diversity
of ﬁrms. As interviewed employees have at least one year of seniority
within the ﬁrm, they belong to its core workforce.
In the full sample of the labor force section of the survey, there are 4,295
employees. However, in our analysis, we do not take into account employ-
ees with supervision activities (1,214 individuals) or employees working
part time (177 individuals). Indeed, the former combine a position of Prin-
cipal and of Agent that we have not investigated theoretically, while part
time leads to badly measured eﬀort and wages. We obtain a subsample of
2,904 employees.
The available information on the practice of individual evaluation inter-
views stems from the following question: Do you have at least one evalua-
tion interview per year (yes / no)? Because of their seniority in the ﬁrm, we
know that all interviewed employees had the opportunity of being evalu-
ated at least once.
The labor force section of the COI survey describes in detail work or-
ganization. It includes a whole set of questions capturing whether work is
structured around group activities. From these questions, we build up ﬁve
diﬀerent measures of interaction between employees in the course of the
work process: being part of a team, time spent in teamwork, intensity of
communication with other workers, level of support from other workers,
participation in meetings (see appendix A for detailed questions). These
ﬁve measure are positively correlated, with correlations ranging between
0.04 (intensity of communication with time spent in team work) and 0.18
(being part of a team and level of support from other workers). Thus, they
measure diﬀerent dimensions of collective work. We derive from these ﬁve
measures a synthetic binary indicator of collective work. When it takes the
value 1, the employee is considered as being a “collective” worker, when it
takes the value 0, he or she is considered as being an individual worker. Ac-
cording to this variable, our sample of employees breaks down into 1,537
individual workers and 1,367 collective workers.
Table 3.1 gives the distribution of individual evaluation interviews ac-
cording to our synthetic binary indicator of collective work. In 1997, 37.2%
of the employees have been interviewed at least once. Evaluation inter-
views are positively correlated with collective work: 47 percent of collective
workers have been evaluated against 29 percent of individual employees.
The COI survey also measures diﬀerent eﬀort indicators. Productive
eﬀort is measured through two questions indicating if the employee works
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considered as very highif the employee sometimes increases hours worked
for personal reasons, as high if he or she sometimes increases hours
worked in response to the ﬁrm’s demand, and as low if longer hours never
happen. According to these three situations, the productive eﬀort indica-
tor, respectively, takes a value of 2, 1, or 0. The cognitive eﬀort indicator
is a binary variable indicating if the employee makes propositions to im-
prove his or her workstations, the production process, or the machines. It
measures an involvement in collective knowledge building about the pro-
ductive activity, allowing continuous improvement of the production pro-
cess.
Two additional measures are included in the analysis to identify if eﬀort
is going beyond reasonable levels, creating an overload that could be detri-
mental for work eﬃciency and for the employee’s health. A ﬁrst variable
indicates how often an employee has to hurry in the course of his or her
work. Four states are taken into account: hurrying almost all the time,
hurrying for one quarter of the time or more, hurrying for less than a quar-
ter of the time, and never. The hurry variable, respectively, takes the value
4, 3, 2, and 1 according to the intensity of the pressure. Work overload is
also measured through a binary indicator telling whether the employee of-
ten has to interrupt one task to carry out another urgent and nonantici-
pated one.
Finally, we measure the employee’s annualized net wage in euros. As it
comes from an administrative data ﬁle used to compute social contribu-
tions, it is precisely measured and includes all bonuses, taxed allowances,
and compensations in kind. We also build up an indicator of the employees’
ability to predict their wages. It rests on a question about the elements that
have a big inﬂuence on the employee’s wage or promotion, followed by a
list of eight items. We compute the ratio of the number of yes responses 
to the list of items, on the number of yes and no, which gives an indicator
taking its value between 0 and 1. Zero means that the employee has no idea
of how to increase his or her wage or chance of promotion, 1 means that
the employee knows that he or she can improve his or her situation and is
aware of what to do to obtain this outcome.
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Table 3.1 Evaluation among individual workers and collective workers
Evaluation Individual workers Collective workers
Yes 445 (29%) 637 (47%)
No 1,092 (71%)a 730 (53%)
Total 1,537 (53%) 1,367 (47%)
aPercentage with respect to the analyzed subsample of 2,904 employees.3.3 Estimation Strategy
We want to measure the impact of evaluation interviews on eﬀort, work
overload, and wages, but we know from the DGU model that evaluation
interviews induce a selection process. Employees with a low disutility of
eﬀort and, in the case on teamwork, with a team spirit are going to be at-
tracted by jobs where evaluation interviews are conducted periodically. A
possible way to measure outcomes related to evaluation interviews, taking
into account the selection eﬀect, is to consider evaluation interviews as
treatments and to apply a propensity score method to match each treated
individual with a nontreated individual with the same characteristics in or-
der to turn our nonexperimental data into a quasi experiment.
A simple way to test the predictions of the DGU model is to consider
evaluation interviews as treatments and to evaluate the eﬀect of this treat-
ment on the chosen variables for measuring eﬀort, wages, and beliefs about
wages. More precisely, let t be a dummy variable equal to 1 if the employee
declares being evaluated and 0 otherwise. Three quantities are of interest
to us. The ﬁrst is the average treatment eﬀect over the whole population,
written C; the second is the average treatment eﬀect over the treated indi-
viduals, written C1; and the third is the average treatment eﬀect over the
nontreated individuals, written C0. More precisely, let Y be the chosen vari-
ables for measuring eﬀort, wages, and beliefs about wages. Then C mea-
sures the variation of Ythat would be observed if the whole population was
treated; C1 is an evaluation of the eﬀect of the treatment in the usual sense
because it concerns the treated population; and C0 is a prospective evalua-
tion in the sense that it measures what would happen if the nontreated pop-
ulation was treated. We have:
C   E(Y1 – Y0)
C1   E(Y1 – Y0 | t   1)
C0   E(Y1 – Y0 | t   0),
where Y1 is the observed value of Y that results when receiving treatment
(that is, when being evaluated), Y0 is the observed value of Y that results
when not receiving treatment (that is, when not being evaluated), and E(.)
denotes expectation in the population. Intuitively, an estimate of an aver-
age treatment eﬀect could be the diﬀerence between the average of Y over
the population of treated individuals and its average over the population of
nontreated individuals, that is,
Y  1 – Y  0,
where Y  1 and Y  0 are, respectively, the average of Y for treated (evaluated
employees) and the nontreated (nonevaluated employees).
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eﬀect of a treatment is that for each individual we only observe
Y   t   Y1   (1 – t)   Y0    .
Then it can be shown that the average diﬀerence between treated and non-
treated individuals can be the cause of a selection bias because the data
does not result from a randomized experiment. And when testing evalua-
tion eﬀects (on eﬀort, overload, and wages), there is a need to control for
naturally occurring systematic diﬀerences in background characteristics
between the treated population and the nontreated population, which
would not occur in the context of a randomized experiment. Moreover, 
according to prediction 2, individual evaluation interviews aﬀect employ-
ees’ eﬀorts through a selection eﬀect associated to disutility or to team
spirit, an incentive eﬀect that in our case is estimated by the average treat-
ment (evaluation) eﬀect. Therefore, in order to estimate the average treat-
ment (evaluation) eﬀect, it is also necessary to control for the selection bias
due to disutility. Although it seems diﬃcult to control “directly” for this se-
lection eﬀect because disutility or team spirit are not observable charac-
teristics, we can assume that they are grounded on observable background
characteristics of the employee and of the employer, and, hence, control-
ling for them allows to control for the selection.
We will discuss in the next section the background characteristics we will
take into account to estimate the eﬀect of individual evaluation interviews.
We choose to use the propensity score methodology introduced by Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983). This method reduces the entire collection of back-
ground characteristics to a single composite characteristic that appropri-
ately summarizes the collection. Propensity score technology allows to
correct the selection bias by matching individuals according to their pro-
pensity score, which is the estimated probability of receiving the treat-
ment (of being evaluated) given background characteristics. We are going
to use a nonparametric kernel matching estimator proposed by Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), which under some regularity assump-
tions is convergent and asymptotically normal.
3.4 The Results
3.4.1 Determinants of Individual Evaluation Interviews
The ﬁrst step of the propensity score method is to analyze the determi-
nants of evaluation interviews, taking into account background character-
istics that inﬂuence the employee’s probability of receiving a periodical
Y1 if t   1
Y0 if t   0
Subjective Evaluation of a Performance and Evaluation Review 113evaluation interview and the three categories of outcomes we consider:
eﬀort, work overload, and wages.
In this step, it is very important to take into account individual eﬀects as
well as contextual eﬀects. As we have pointed out, personal characteristics
of the employee like team spirit or disutility of eﬀort are going to play a
crucial role in inﬂuencing both the chances of being evaluated and the out-
comes we consider. These characteristics are not directly observable, but
we are going to take into account observables that are possibly correlated
with them: gender, age, seniority, education level, and occupation. It is
clear that these personal characteristics have impacts on eﬀort levels, work
overload, and wages.
The fact that our employee sample is matched with a survey describing
the characteristics of ﬁrms is an important advantage in our estimation
strategy. The DGU model has stressed that the production technology plays
a role in the diﬀusion of evaluation interviews. A supermodular technology
is more favorable than a submodular technology. In order to control for the
technology, we are going to include the regression size and sector dummies.
Stemming from an employer database, information on size and sector is
much more precise than the information usually included in labor force sur-
veys. We also include a measure of the ﬁrm’s computerization intensity. We
choose to build up a variable describing the intensity of numerical data
transfers within and outside the ﬁrm. Moreover, evaluation interviews
could be complementary to other organizational practices, and these prac-
tices could also have an inﬂuence on outcomes. Eight new organizational
practices are considered in the logistic regression: quality certiﬁcation, to-
tal quality management, methods to analyze products and processes (value
analysis; functional analysis; Failure Mode, Eﬀects, and Criticality Anal-
ysis [FMECA]), total productive maintenance (TPM), organization in
proﬁt center, formal in-house customer/supplier contracts, system of just-
in-time delivery, and system of just-in-time production. We also detail
diﬀerent teamwork practices: self-managed teams, problem solving groups,
and project teams. Finally, we take into account the evolution of the num-
ber of hierarchical layers in the ﬁrm and variables indicating diﬃculties con-
nected with the implementation of organizational changes.
Appendix C presents the parameters estimated of the logistic models ex-
plaining individual evaluation interviews for individual workers and for
collective workers. In the case of individual workers, we ﬁnd that employee
characteristics have higher explanatory power than employer characteris-
tics. More precisely, male workers in executive or middle management po-
sitions with either low seniority (one or two years) or intermediate senior-
ity (seven to ten years) have a higher probability of being evaluated. We
have to keep in mind that even though some of the interviewed workers
have management positions, they have no formal hierarchical authority 
as they declare no subordinates. Among the employer characteristics, the
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the highest size cluster; sector, with a positive impact of ﬁve sectors (phar-
maceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products; chemicals, rubber, and plas-
tic products; electrical and electronic equipment; electrical and electronic
components; and shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway); and quality certiﬁ-
cation (ISO 9001, ISO 9002, and EAQF).
In contrast, in the case of collective workers, employer characteristics
tend to explain more than employee characteristics. Indeed, for team
workers the only personal characteristic that inﬂuences the probability of
being evaluated is the level of education: a second or third level of educa-
tion is associated with a coeﬃcient that is positive and signiﬁcant. On the
employer side, size, sector, computer intensity, use of new organizational
devices, and use of teamwork have a signiﬁcant impact on the probability
of being evaluated. Employers with medium size (between 100 and 999 em-
ployees) and belonging to pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning prod-
ucts or to chemicals, rubber, and plastic products use evaluation interviews
more frequently. Employers from printing, press, and publishing and ship-
building, aircraft, and railways have a lower probability of being inter-
viewed. The intensity of computerization favors evaluation interviews of
collective workers as well as quality certiﬁcation and total productive
maintenance. Conversely, employers using just-in-time delivery are less
oriented toward evaluation interviews for collective workers. Having a
nonmarginal fraction of production workers in problem solving groups fa-
vors evaluation interviews, while having a small fraction of nonproduction
workers participating in self-managed teams and having management in-
volved in project teams has a negative impact on evaluation interviews. In
total, evaluation interviews for collective workers seem complementary
with information technologies and new organizational practices. These
managerial tools could support a supermodular production technology,
where the employer has a preference for higher levels of eﬀort.
3.4.2 Observing the Outcomes of Individual Evaluation
We are now going to discuss the matching evaluation of the eﬀect of 
individual evaluation interviews on individual and collective workers on
eﬀort (table 3.2), work overload (table 3.3), and wages (table 3.4). In each
table, we ﬁrst compute as a benchmark the average outcome for individual
and collective workers. Second, we compute the average diﬀerence in out-
come between workers that have been individually evaluated and workers
that have not been evaluated. This estimator is often designated as the
naive estimator of the treatment eﬀect. Then we compute the three causal
eﬀects: the eﬀect on the treated (C1), the eﬀect on the nontreated (C0), and
the global eﬀect (C). The ﬁrst eﬀect is the matching evaluation strictly
speaking, the second one represents the eﬀect that evaluation interviews
would have if they were implemented on the nonevaluated population of
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interviews were extended to the entire population.
Eﬀort
We observe higher levels of productive and cognitive eﬀorts when work
is collective rather than individual (table 3.2). This was not entirely ex-
pected because our model underlined that one of the advantage of collec-
tive work was to share the burden of higher levels of eﬀort between work-
ers. However, other eﬀects might play a role here. The DGU model (as well
as the analysis of determinants of evaluation interviews) suggests that col-
lective work is positively correlated with supermodular production tech-
nologies. Another explanation could lie in synergy and peer pressure ef-
fects connected with collective work.
As predicted by the DGU model, we observe that the level of eﬀort,
whether productive or cognitive, is higher when workers are individually
evaluated than in the classical incentive scheme (prediction 1).
The causal treatment eﬀect on productive eﬀort is stronger for individ-
ual workers than for collective workers. And the selection eﬀect has an op-
posite sign. Individual workers displaying higher level of eﬀort are selected
in the population of evaluated workers, when they are selected out in the
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Table 3.2 Individual evaluation interviews and effort
Individual workersa Collective workersb
Productive effortc
Average productive effort 0.564 0.720
Average difference E/NE 0.127*** 0.092***
Effect on the treated (C1) 0.084** 0.120**
Effect on the nontreated (Co) 0.093** 0.100**
Global effect (C) 0.091** 0.110**
Cognitive effortc
Average cognitive effort 0.507 0.722
Average difference E/NE 0.143*** 0.140***
Effect on the treated (C1) 0.099** 0.110**
Effect on the nontreated (Co) 0.120** 0.110**
Global effect (C) 0.114** 0.110**
aThe standard deviation of the treatment effect is computed using bootstrap with 300 simu-
lations. The characteristics of the support over 300 simulations are min = 1,352; max = 1,501;
mean = 1,426.48.
bThe standard deviation of the treatment effect is computed using bootstrap with 300 simu-
lations. The characteristics of the support over 300 simulations are min = 1,124; max = 1,304;
mean = 1,229.03
cSee section B of appendix A for a description of these variables.
***p-value < 0.01.
**0.01 ≥ p-value < 0.05.
*0.05 ≥ p-value < 0.1.case of collective work. This result corroborates prediction 2 although the
DGU model gives no speciﬁc clue to understand our surprising result on
collective workers. The extension of evaluation interviews to the whole
population of collective workers would consequently increase productive
eﬀort although it is already high in this case.
The observed eﬀects on cognitive eﬀort are more straightforward. Eval-
uation interviews similarly aﬀect cognitive eﬀort for individual and collec-
tive workers: they increase by 14 percent the propensity to make proposi-
tions for improving the production process. In the case of cognitive eﬀort,
the selection eﬀect has an identic sign among individual and collective
workers, but it is stronger in the ﬁrst case.
Work Overload
Individual and collective workers work with a similar time pressure: the
average need to hurry is 2.67 in the ﬁrst case, 2.64 in the second (table 3.3),
indicating that workers have to hurry a little more than a quarter of their
time. Our second indicator of work overload is higher for collective work-
ers: 65 percent of collective workers experience task interruptions in the
course of their work, whereas 53 percent of individual workers face inter-
ruptions.
However, it is in the case of individual workers that evaluation interviews
have a signiﬁcant impact as it appears to mitigate work overload. Individ-
ual workers that are periodically evaluated work under lower time pressure
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Table 3.3 Individual evaluation interviews and work overload
Individual workersa Collective workersb
Hurryc
Average overload 2.666 2.640
Average difference E/NE –0.143** –0.110*
Effect on the treated (C1) –0.142 (ns) –0.108 (ns)
Effect on the nontreated (Co) –0.189** –0.073 (ns)
Global effect (C) –0.176** –0.089 (ns)
Interruptc
Average overload 0.526 0.650
Average difference E/NE –0.053* 0.009 (ns)
Effect on the treated (C1) –0.065** 0.002 (ns)
Effect on the nontreated (Co) –0.066** –0.003 (ns)
Global effect (C) –0.066** –0.000 (ns)
aSee table 3.2 footnote.
bSee table 3.2 footnote.
cSee section C of appendix A for a description of these variables.
***p-value < 0.01.
**0.01 ≥ p-value < 0.05.
*0.05 ≥ p-value < 0.1.and are less exposed to task interruptions. In the case of time pressure, the
selection eﬀect seems to play an important role as the causal eﬀect on the
treated is not signiﬁcant. But evaluation interviews also seem to have a pro-
tective eﬀect on their own because the eﬀect on the nontreated is negative,
signiﬁcant, and stronger than the naive estimator. Individual workers who
have been selected out from evaluation interviews would beneﬁt from their
implementation. As far as task interruptions are concerned, the protective
eﬀect of evaluation interviews is not explained by a selection eﬀect; it is a
pure outcome of this managerial device.
Evaluation interviews do not protect collective workers from work over-
load, but they do not increase their risk of exposition either. It is also an in-
teresting result, knowing that collective workers produce higher levels of
productive and cognitive eﬀorts.
These results could be evidence of prediction 3. Evaluation interviews in
a context of supermodular technology lead to an overintensiﬁcation of
work, but not to work overload. On the contrary, they seem to mitigate
work overload, either through a selection eﬀect as described in the DGU
model, or through a pure eﬀect.
Wage Setting
Collective workers earn more, on average, than individual workers (table
3.4). We also observe that, on average, evaluated employees earn more
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Table 3.4 Individual evaluation interviews and wage setting
Individual workersa Collective workersb
Annualized net wage (in euros)c
Average net wage 15,003  16,586
Average difference E/NE 1,654*** 1,925***
Effect on the treated (C1) 198 (ns) 1,310**
Effect on the nontreated (Co) 275 (ns) 1,062**
Global effect (C) 253 (ns) 1,174**
Employee’s ability to predict his or her wagec
Average ability to predict 0.491 0.597
Average difference E/NE 0.164*** 0.136***
Effect on the treated (C1) 0.145*** 0.110***
Effect on the nontreated (Co) 0.147*** 0.100***
Global effect (C) 0.146*** 0.100***
aSee table 3.2 footnote.
bSee table 3.2 footnote.
cSee sections D and E of appendix A for a description of these variables.
***p-value < 0.01.
**0.01 ≥ p-value < 0.05.
*0.05 ≥ p-value < 0.1.than employees in a classical incentive scheme, conﬁrming prediction 4.
These monetary gains are higher for collective than for individual workers:
1,925 euros per year, on average, against 1,654 euros per year. For individ-
ual workers, this diﬀerence is entirely explained by the selection eﬀect: the
causal eﬀects on the treated is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and the
causal eﬀect on the nontreated is also nonsigniﬁcant. Contrary to individ-
ual workers, the monetary gain of collective workers is only slightly lower
when selection is taken into account: the gain falls from 1,925 euros to
1,310 euros if we consider the causal eﬀect on the treated, to 1,062 if we
consider the causal eﬀect on the nontreated, and to 1,174 if we consider the
global eﬀect.
Concerning the employee’s ability to predict his or her wage, we ﬁrst note
that this ability is greater, on average, for collective workers than for indi-
vidual workers, and in both cases the average diﬀerence between evaluated
and nonevaluated workers is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover,
this eﬀect of evaluation interview still remains signiﬁcant when one cor-
rects for the selection eﬀect. As stated by prediction 4, evaluated workers
have a better knowledge of the rules driving wage setting.
3.5 Conclusion
Diaye, Greenan, and Urdanivia (2007) have proposed a theoretical
framework based on a Principal-Agent model to analyze the underlying
mechanisms of individual evaluation interviews in the case of individual
production and of team production (DGU model). They distinguish an ex
post evaluation interview that builds a subjective evaluation of employees’
eﬀort and an ex ante evaluation interview which, in the case of team pro-
duction, works as a coordination device through the fostering of a team
spirit. Their theoretical analysis allows deriving testable predictions re-
garding the eﬀect of individual evaluation interviews on productive and
cognitive eﬀort, on work overload, and on wage setting.
Using a matched employer-employee survey on computerization and or-
ganizational change (COI), we are able to test part of these predictions and
to corroborate them. First, evaluation interviews have a positive impact on
productive and cognitive eﬀort. Second, evaluation interviews increase
eﬀort through two eﬀects: the classical incentive eﬀect and also a selection
eﬀect. Third, the selection eﬀect is stronger in the case of individual pro-
duction compared with the case of team production. Fourth, evaluated em-
ployees earn more than employees in a classical incentive scheme, and ﬁfth,
evaluated workers have a better knowledge of the rules driving wage setting.
The DGU model also suggests a higher propensity to evaluate workers
in ﬁrms when the production technology is of a supermodular type and an
overintensiﬁcation of work in such a technological context. Our empirical
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permodular technologies as collective workers are more frequently evalu-
ated and provide a higher level of eﬀort than individual workers. However,
evaluation interviews are not associated with work overload. On the con-
trary, individual workers seem to be protected from work overload when
they are evaluated, and collective workers do not register a higher exposure
to work overload even though they provide higher levels of eﬀort. This
could be an indirect evidence of the selection eﬀect already stressed. Eval-
uated workers produce higher levels of eﬀort, but their personal character-
istics or the characteristics of their employers allow them to better cope
with it.
Appendix A
Variables Constructed from the Labor Force 
Section of the COI Survey
A. Measures of Collective Work
In the COI survey, a sample of randomly selected employees within in-
terviewed ﬁrms (one, two, or three per ﬁrm) are asked to describe in detail
the way they work at the time when they are being surveyed.
Measure 1: Teamwork
This measure is associated to the following question: “Do you some-
times do your work in group or collectively?”
Response is either “yes” or “no.”
Measure 2: Time Spent in Teamwork
This measure is constructed from the following question asked to em-
ployees who declared working in group or collectively: “How much of your
working time do you work in group or collectively?”
Responses are “Almost all the time,” “More than a quarter of your time,”
“Less than a quarter of your time.”
Measure 3: Communication in the Firm
This measure is constructed from the following four questions:
“Apart from your superiors, are there other persons who give you indica-
tions on what you have to do?” (Responses are either “yes” or “no,” or “it
does not apply.”)
1. “Colleagues you usually work with?”
2. “Other persons or departments in the ﬁrm?”
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on what they have to do?” (Responses are either “yes” or “no” or “it does
not apply.”)
3. “Colleagues you usually work with?”
4. “Other persons or departments in the ﬁrm?”
Then a low intensity of communication corresponds to 0 or 1 positive an-
swer among these four questions, and a highintensity of communication to
at least two positive answers among the four questions.
Measure 4: Support from Other Workers
The measure is constructed from the following three questions:
“If you have a temporary excess workload or if you are uneasy with a diﬃ-
cult task, are you helped by . . .” (Responses are either “yes” or “no” or “it
does not apply.”)
1. “your superiors?”
2. “colleagues you usually work with?”
3. “other persons or departments in the ﬁrm?”
Then a low level of support from other workers corresponds to 0 or 1 pos-
itive answer, and a highlevel of support corresponds to at least two positive
answers among the three questions.
Measure 5: Participation in Meetings
The measure is constructed from the following question: “How many
times a year do you participate in meetings in the context of your work?”
Then a low participation in meetings corresponds to 0 or only one meeting
a year, and a high participation in meetings corresponds to at least two
meetings a year. (See tables 3A.1 and 3A.2.)
B. Measures of Eﬀort
Two dimensions of eﬀort are captured in the COI survey.
The ﬁrst one describes the level of productive eﬀort.It is built from the an-
swers to the two following questions: (1) “Do you work more than ordi-
narily?” (Response is either “yes” or “no”); (2) If yes, “Do you work more
than ordinarily for personals reasons?” (Response is either “yes” or “no.”)
Employee’s eﬀort is a variable with three levels: 0 when the answer to
question (1) is “no,” 1 when the answer to question (1) is “yes” and the an-
swer to question (2) is “no,” 2 when both the answers to questions (1) and
(2) are “yes.”
The second one describes the level of cognitive eﬀort or, more precisely,
the degree of implication into collective knowledge building about the pro-
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“In the context of your work, do you make propositions to improve your
workstation, the production process, the machines . . . ?” (Response is
either “yes” or “no.”)
C. Measures of Work Overload
Two indicators measure work overload:
• Hurry is a discrete variable. It is equal to 1 if the employee states that
he or she never has to hurry to do his work. It is equal to 2 if he or she
states that it is the case for less than one quarter of the time. It is equal
to 3 if he or she states that it is the case for one quarter of the time or
more. And it is equal to 4 if he or she states that he or she has to hurry
almost all the time.
• Interruptis a dummy variable equal to 1 when the employee states that
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Table 3A.2 Correlation coefﬁcients between the ﬁve measures of interaction 
between employees
Measure 1 Measure 2 Measure 3 Measure 4 Measure 5
Measure 1 1.00000
Measure 2 0.63486 1.00000
Measure 3 0.15159 0.04493 1.00000
Measure 4 0.17993 0.11736 0.14987 1.00000
Measure 5 0.13480 0.04775 0.17168 0.08567 1.00000
Table 3A.1 Five measures of interaction between employees in the work process
Frequency Percent
Measure 1: Teamwork
No (0) 1,422 48.97
Yes (1) 1,482 51.03
Measure 2: Teamwork intensity
Less than 1/4 of time (0) 2,045 70.42
1/4 of time or more (1) 859 29.58
Measure 3: Communication intensity
Low (0) 1,019 35.09
High (1) 1,885 64.91
Measure 4: Level of support
Low (0) 1,537 52.93
High (1) 1,367 47.07
Measure 5: Participation in meetings
Low (0) 1,557 53.62
High (1) 1,347 46.38he or she often has interrupt one task to carry out another urgent and
nonanticipated one. It is equal to 0 otherwise.
D. Measure of Monetary Incentives
Monetary incentives are captured through annualized net wage (in eu-
ros). It comes from the annual declarations of social data (DADS), which
is an administrative ﬁle used to compute the tax on wages. It groups all
earnings paid in cash or kind between the 1st of January and the 31st of De-
cember 1996, less social contributions (social security, pensions, and un-
employment beneﬁt).
This compensation includes base wage, all bonuses, taxed allowances,
and compensations in kind. Bonuses associated with the two French proﬁt
sharing regimes (participation and intéressement) are not included when
they are not taxed. However, bonuses connected to participation schemes
are generally not taxed when the reverse is true for bonuses connected to
intéressement schemes. It is the length of the period during which bonuses
remain unavailable that determines taxation. In the case of participation,
when this unavailability period is shortened to three years, the bonuses be-
come partly eligible to taxation. In the case of intéressement, bonuses are
partly exonerated from taxes when they are blocked for a while in a com-
pany saving scheme.
If we except bonuses connected with participation, compulsory in ﬁrms
with more than ﬁfty employees, most of the earnings that contribute to an
individualization of compensations are taken into account in our variable.
Thus, we may interpret it as an output of the wage policy of the ﬁrm.
Last, compensations correspond to employment periods that vary from
one employee to the other. We have annualized the information we had,
taking into account the number of days worked. This does not correct for
part time, but only 6 percent of the employees in our sample declare work-
ing part time.
E. Employee’s Ability to Predict His or Her Wage
This variable is built from the answers to the eight following questions:
“Which of the following elements have a big inﬂuence on your wage or on
your promotion” (for each element, response is either “yes” or “no” or “it
does not apply”): (1) “To do a high-quality work?”; (2) “To carry assign-
ments to the letter?”; (3) “To be on good terms with the boss (bosses)?”; (4)
“To be on good terms with the colleague(s)?”; (5) “To take up training
courses?”; (6) “To learn how to use new technologies?”; (7) “The ﬁrm’s per-
formances?”; (8) “Other reasons?”
The employee’s ability to predict his or her wage is then the ratio of num-
ber of “yes” answers to the number of “yes” or “no.”
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Variables Constructed from the 
Firm Section of the COI Survey
A. Firms’ Computerization Intensity
This variable in constructed from the following question:
“Did/Does your ﬁrm realize data transfers by means of a computer inter-
face . . .” (Response is either “yes” or “no”):
1. “within the management service?”
2. “between management and production service?”
3. “between management and suppliers, subcontractors?”
4. “between management and client ﬁrms?”
5. “between management and social organisms public power?”
6. “between conception services and production?”
7. “between conception and suppliers, subcontractors?”
8. “within the production services or between manufacturer unities?”
9. “between production and suppliers, subcontractors?”
10. “between production and client ﬁrms?”
Computerization intensity is equal to 1 if there is 0 or 1 “yes”; intensity
2 corresponds to two or three “yes”; intensity 3 corresponds to four or ﬁve
“yes”; and intensity 4 corresponds to ﬁve and more “yes.”
B. Average Number of Tasks That Each Type of Worker 
Is Responsible for (NMT)
This variable is constructed from the question (responses are “Man-
agement”/“Production Worker”/“Specialist”: more than one answer is
possible for each subquestion). “In general, who is/was authorized in 1997
t o... ” :
1. adjust installations?
2. perform ﬁrst level maintenance?
3. allocate tasks to production workers?
4. inspect quality of supplies?
5. inspect quality of production?
6. participate in performance improvements?
7. participate in project teams?
8. stop production in case of an incident?
9. troubleshoot in case of an incident?
10. start production again in case of an incident?
The qualitative variable NMT with four items is constructed as follows:
124 Marc-Arthur Diaye, Nathalie Greenan, and Michal W. UrdaniviaNMT   1.7 (High responsibility sharing between the three types of work-
ers: Management, Production Worker, and Specialist)
1.4   NMT   1.7 (Medium responsibility sharing)
1   NMT   1.4 (Low responsibility sharing)
NTM   1 (No responsibility sharing)
Appendix C
Logistic Regression Results for the Binary Outcome
“Evaluated/Not Evaluated”
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Table 3C.1 The case of individual production
Standard 
Parameter Estimate error Wald χ2 Pr >χ 2
Intercept –2.0329 0.3485 34.0305 <.0001
Sociodemographic characteristics of employee
Gendera –0.2524 0.1519 2.7595 0.0967
Ageb
15–24 –0.1760 0.4762 0.1366 0.7116
25–39 –0.0446 0.1963 0.0515 0.8205
40–49 0.2130 0.1865 1.3044 0.2534
Years in the ﬁrmc
1–2 0.6301 0.2374 7.0452 0.0079
3–6 0.2496 0.1952 1.6355 0.2010
7–10 0.3229 0.1756 3.3827 0.0659
Level of educationd
Vocational training (CAP and BEP) –0.0175 0.1503 0.0135 0.9074
Second-level education (BAC) –0.0885 0.2581 0.1177 0.7316
Third-level education –0.0496 0.2607 0.0363 0.8489
Professional typee
Executives 0.6554 0.3603 3.3089 0.0689
Middle management 0.7697 0.2356 10.6728 0.0011
Clerk 0.3463 0.2461 1.9801 0.1594
Skilled blue collar –0.0568 0.1670 0.1156 0.7339
General characteristics of the ﬁrm
Firm sizef
100–499 –0.0328 0.1744 0.0355 0.8506
500–999 0.0294 0.2264 0.0168 0.8968
1000 and more 0.6202 0.2525 6.0334 0.0140
Industry sectorg
Mineral products 0.4561 0.3481 1.7165 0.1901
Textile 0.4668 0.3269 2.0391 0.1533
Clothing and leather –0.2872 0.4127 0.4845 0.4864
Wood and paper 0.1410 0.3348 0.1773 0.6737
Printing, press, publishing 0.2648 0.3902 0.4605 0.4974
(continued)Production of propellants and fuels 1.0360 1.4831 0.4880 0.4848
Chemicals, rubber, and plastic products 0.6593 0.2753 5.7342 0.0166
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products 1.7797 0.3673 23.4742 <.0001
Foundry and metal work products –0.0104 0.2843 0.0013 0.9709
Mechanical engineering 0.1636 0.2718 0.3625 0.5471
Household equipment 0.0894 0.3122 0.0821 0.7745
Electrical and electronic equipment 0.9187 0.4546 4.0840 0.0433
Electrical and electronic components 0.6605 0.2988 4.8870 0.0271
Automobile 0.3523 0.3630 0.9420 0.3318
Shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway 0.6672 0.3829 3.0367 0.0814
Firms’ computerization intensityh
Intensity 2 0.0295 0.1914 0.0238 0.8773
Intensity 3 0.1274 0.2034 0.3923 0.5311
Intensity 4 0.0664 0.2266 0.0860 0.7694
Obstacles to the organizational changesi
Tensions between the services –0.2390 0.1760 1.8428 0.1746
Tensions with the shareholders 0.0501 0.2123 0.0558 0.8133
Difﬁculties in the relations with the other ﬁrms 0.0393 0.1899 0.0429 0.8359
Difﬁculties to school or to reclassify the staff –0.0221 0.1621 0.0186 0.8915
Nonexecutive staff adaptations and establishment 
problems –0.0908 0.1751 0.2688 0.6041
Executive staff adaptations and establishment problems 0.2754 0.1679 2.6886 0.1011
Clashes with the staff (petitions, strikes, etc.) –0.0970 0.2035 0.2271 0.6337
Use of new organizational devicesj
ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF certiﬁcation 0.4734 0.1616 8.5854 0.0034
Other certiﬁcation or total quality management 0.0457 0.1394 0.1073 0.7432
Value analysis, functional analysis, or FMECA method 0.00832 0.1633 0.0026 0.9593
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance 
(TPM) method 0.2457 0.1768 1.9307 0.1647
Organization in proﬁt centers 0.1212 0.1398 0.7517 0.3859
Formal in-house customer/supplier contracts 0.0257 0.1402 0.0335 0.8547
System of “Just-in-time” delivery 0.1323 0.1786 0.5483 0.4590
System of “Just-in-time” production –0.0757 0.1793 0.1785 0.6727
Evolution in hierarchical layers between 1994 and 1997k
1 and more –0.0725 0.2648 0.0750 0.7842
–1 –0.1617 0.1748 0.8556 0.3550
–2 and less 0.1750 0.2874 0.3707 0.5426
Teamwork
Share of production workers participating in 
self-managed teamsl
10% to less than 50% –0.1373 0.1965 0.4879 0.4849
50% and more 0.1451 0.2585 0.3149 0.5747
Share of production workers participating in problem 
solving groupsl
10% to less than 50% 0.3005 0.1927 2.4314 0.1189
50% and more 0.5594 0.3928 2.0281 0.1544
Table 3C.1 (continued)
Standard 
Parameter Estimate error Wald χ2 Pr >χ 2Share of production workers participating in project 
teamsl
10% to less than 50% 0.1398 0.1958 0.5101 0.4751
50% and more –0.9496 0.5843 2.6415 0.1041
Share of other workers participating in self-managed 
teamsl
10% to less than 50% 0.1439 0.2051 0.4921 0.4830
50% and more –0.1158 0.3478 0.1108 0.7392
Share of other workers participating in problem 
solving groupsl
10% to less than 50% –0.1922 0.2010 0.9143 0.3390
50% and more –0.0789 0.3770 0.0438 0.8343
Share of other workers participating in project teamsl
10% to less than 50% –0.2005 0.1941 1.0673 0.3016
50% and more 0.3645 0.3384 1.1598 0.2815
Who is/was authorized in 1997 to participate in 
project teams?m
Management –0.2209 0.1608 1.8877 0.1695
Production worker 0.0596 0.1448 0.1694 0.6806
Specialist –0.2073 0.1627 1.6232 0.2027
Average number of tasks that each type of worker 
is responsible forn
1.1–1.4 –0.0469 0.1864 0.0635 0.8011
1.5–1.7 0.1619 0.2226 0.5292 0.4669
1.8 and more 0.3439 0.2386 2.0764 0.1496
aReference is “men.”
bReference is “50 and more.”
cReference is “11 and more.”
dReference is “with no degree except CEP or BEPC.”
eReference is “unskilled blue collar.”
fReference is “99 and less.”
gReference is “food industries.”
hReference is “intensity 1.” See section A of appendix B for the construction of this variable.
iThe variable is equal to 1 when the ﬁrms states that such an obstacle has been either “quite important,”
“important,” or “very important,” and 0 when she states that it has been “unimportant.”
jResponse is either “yes” or “no.”
kReference is “0.”
lReference is “less than 10%.”
mResponse is either “yes” or “no.”
nReference is “≤ 1.” See section B of appendix B for the construction of the variable.
Table 3C.1 (continued)
Standard 
Parameter Estimate error Wald χ2 Pr >χ 2Table 3C.2 The case of team production
Standard 
Parameter Estimate error Wald χ2 Pr >χ 2
Intercept –1.7432 0.3745 21.6633 <.0001
Sociodemographic characteristics of the employee
Gendera –0.1403 0.1523 0.8481 0.3571
Ageb
15–24 0.5015 0.4257 1.3880 0.2387
25–39 0.2781 0.2295 1.4691 0.2255
40–49 0.2781 0.2295 1.4691 0.2255
Years in the ﬁrmc
1–2 –0.2096 0.2443 0.7363 0.3908
3–6 0.1818 0.1820 0.9972 0.3180
7–10 0.0170 0.1730 0.0097 0.9217
Level of educationd
Vocational training (CAP and BEP) 0.1829 0.1567 1.3621 0.2432
Second-level education (BAC) 0.4481 0.2421 3.4263 0.0642
Third-level education 0.5279 0.2645 3.9823 0.0460
Professional typee
Executives 0.5416 0.3485 2.4147 0.1202
Middle management 0.1200 0.2284 0.2761 0.5993
Clerk –0.0121 0.2972 0.0017 0.9675
Skilled blue collar –0.1469 0.1743 0.7101 0.3994
General characteristics of the ﬁrm
Firm sizef
100–499 0.3510 0.1765 3.9524 0.0468
500–999 0.7059 0.2080 11.5179 0.0007
1000 and more 0.1941 0.2422 0.6426 0.4228
Industry sectorg
Mineral products –0.2853 0.3202 0.7942 0.3728
Textile 0.3355 0.4096 0.6708 0.4128
Clothing and leather –0.1220 0.3734 0.1068 0.7439
Wood and paper –0.4769 0.3661 1.6974 0.1926
Printing, press, publishing –0.8333 0.4390 3.6032 0.0577
Production of propellants and fuels 1.2745 0.9040 1.9877 0.1586
Chemicals, rubber, and plastic products 0.6759 0.2593 6.7962 0.0091
Pharmaceutical, perfumes, and cleaning products 1.2302 0.3578 11.8237 0.0006
Foundry and metal work products –0.2956 0.2752 1.1535 0.2828
Mechanical engineering –0.0338 0.2637 0.0164 0.8980
Household equipment 0.1161 0.3083 0.1418 0.7065
Electrical and electronic equipment 0.3344 0.3679 0.8263 0.3633
Electrical and electronic components 0.1719 0.2950 0.3396 0.5601
Automobile –0.2314 0.3329 0.4832 0.4870
Shipbuilding, aircraft, and railway –0.6255 0.3706 2.8479 0.0915
Firms’ computerization intensityh
Intensity 2 0.3321 0.1888 3.0940 0.0786
Intensity 3 0.4203 0.1960 4.5997 0.0320
Intensity 4 0.3323 0.2140 2.4118 0.1204Obstacles to the organizational changes i
Tensions between the services –0.0540 0.1773 0.0927 0.7608
Tensions with the shareholders –0.2445 0.2312 1.1179 0.2904
Difﬁculties in the relations with the other ﬁrms –0.0976 0.1999 0.2382 0.6255
Difﬁculties to school or to reclassify the staff 0.0598 0.1538 0.1513 0.6973
Nonexecutive staff adaptations and establishment 
problems 0.0411 0.1639 0.0629 0.8020
Executive staff adaptations and establishment problems 0.1569 0.1589 0.9750 0.3234
Clashes with the staff (petitions, strikes, etc.) –0.1195 0.1930 0.3833 0.5358
Use of new organizational devices j
ISO 9001, ISO 9002, EAQF Certiﬁcation 0.4089 0.1604 6.4964 0.0108
Other certiﬁcation or total quality management 0.1545 0.1389 1.2379 0.2659
Value analysis, functional analysis, or FMECA method –0.0932 0.1582 0.3470 0.5558
5S method or Total Productive Maintenance 
(TPM) method 0.4285 0.1631 6.8979 0.0086
Organization in proﬁt centers 0.1763 0.1351 1.7015 0.1921
Formal in-house customer/supplier contracts 0.1045 0.1380 0.5728 0.4492
System of “Just-in-time” delivery –0.3277 0.1778 3.3980 0.0653
System of “Just-in-time” production 0.1577 0.1781 0.7846 0.3757
Evolution in hierarchical layers between 1994 and 1997k
1 and more –0.0279 0.2610 0.0114 0.9150
1 –0.0204 0.1629 0.0156 0.9005
2 and less –0.3818 0.2959 1.6652 0.1969
Teamwork
Share of production workers participating in 
self-managed teamsl
10% to less than 50% 0.0247 0.1780 0.0193 0.8895
50% and more 0.0651 0.2613 0.0620 0.8033
Share of production workers participating in problem 
solving groupsl
10% to less than 50% 0.4672 0.1863 6.2869 0.0122
50% and more 0.8599 0.3590 5.7362 0.0166
Share of production workers participating in project 
teamsl
10% to less than 50% –0.0944 0.1838 0.2640 0.6074
50% and more –0.0239 0.4492 0.0028 0.9575
Share of other workers participating in self-managed 
teamsl
10% to less than 50% –0.3616 0.1983 3.3244 0.0683
50% and more –0.2979 0.3314 0.8082 0.3687
Share of other workers participating in problem 
solving groupsl
10% to less than 50% 0.1016 0.2065 0.2419 0.6229
50% and more 0.2644 0.3815 0.4801 0.4884
Table 3C.2 (continued)
Standard 
Parameter Estimate error Wald χ2 Pr >χ 2
(continued)Share of other workers participating in project teamsl
10% to less than 50% 0.1084 0.1851 0.3428 0.5582
50% and more 0.0786 0.3393 0.0537 0.8168
Who is/was authorized in 1997 to participate in 
project teams?m
Management –0.3374 0.1701 3.9368 0.0472
Production worker –0.1134 0.1475 0.5912 0.4420
Specialist 0.1610 0.1591 1.0239 0.3116
Average number of tasks that each type of worker is 
responsible forn
1.1–1.4 0.0988 0.1917 0.2656 0.6063
1.5–1.7 0.1538 0.2221 0.4796 0.4886
1.8 and more –0.1319 0.2414 0.2984 0.5849
aReference is “men.”
bReference is “50 and more.”
cReference is “11 and more.”
dReference is “with no degree except CEP or BEPC.”
eReference is “unskilled blue collar.”
fReference is “99 and less.”
gReference is “food industries.”
hReference is “intensity 1.” See section A of appendix B for the construction of this variable.
iThe variable is equal to 1 when the ﬁrms states that such an obstacle has been either “quite important,”
“important,” or “very important,” and 0 when he or she states that it has been “unimportant.”
jResponse is either “yes” or “no.”
kReference is “0.”
lReference is “less than 10%.”
mResponse is either “yes” or “no.”
nReference is “ ≤ 1.” See section B of appendix B for the construction of the variable.
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